CRS seeks a Peacebuilding/Governance Program Manager for the Sudan. The candidate is being sought to weave Peacebuilding through all program areas. In 2006, CRS in partnership with the Local Governance Board, UNDP and PACT began a long term capacity building program aimed at strengthen the capacity of local government to be more responsive to the needs of civil society and establish this decentralized layer of governance in compliance with the CPA.
Showing posts with label Local Governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Local Governance. Show all posts
Sunday, 24 June 2007
Resource- Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual
This Peacebuilding Manual of Caritas is an excellent resource. It was published with the intent to train Caritas workers and partners to incorporate conflict prevention, peacemaking and reconciliation into their relief, development and social work worldwide.
From the preface:
'Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual builds on the Caritas Handbook Working for
Reconciliation,and extends the material into peacebuilding training and programming. It is a resource that contains both conceptual and practical tools to help fill the peacebuilder’s toolbox. In the manual, peacebuilding in development work is introduced with core concepts, peacebuilding skills, and ideas to connect peacebuilding to programming. The manual aims to provideCaritas Internationalis workers, and other NGO (non- governmental organisation) workers, with flexible training suggestions and materials to support and enhance their efforts in peacebuilding and reconciliation. It is designed for both expert trainers and novices. More specifically, the manual goals are to:
1. Provide ideas and resources for effective peacebuilding trainers;
2. Provide interactive materials that cover the basic conceptual dimensions of
peacebuilding;
3. Provide training modules that identify and enhance skills needed for peacebuilding and reconciliation work;
4. Provide trainers with flexible options that allow them to tailor training to fit
participants’ needs and their local context.
This training manual is designed to assist trainers doing training at two levels. The first is training local Caritas and other NGO workers in peacebuilding concepts, and the second is training the trainers.'
From the preface:
'Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual builds on the Caritas Handbook Working for
Reconciliation,and extends the material into peacebuilding training and programming. It is a resource that contains both conceptual and practical tools to help fill the peacebuilder’s toolbox. In the manual, peacebuilding in development work is introduced with core concepts, peacebuilding skills, and ideas to connect peacebuilding to programming. The manual aims to provideCaritas Internationalis workers, and other NGO (non- governmental organisation) workers, with flexible training suggestions and materials to support and enhance their efforts in peacebuilding and reconciliation. It is designed for both expert trainers and novices. More specifically, the manual goals are to:
1. Provide ideas and resources for effective peacebuilding trainers;
2. Provide interactive materials that cover the basic conceptual dimensions of
peacebuilding;
3. Provide training modules that identify and enhance skills needed for peacebuilding and reconciliation work;
4. Provide trainers with flexible options that allow them to tailor training to fit
participants’ needs and their local context.
This training manual is designed to assist trainers doing training at two levels. The first is training local Caritas and other NGO workers in peacebuilding concepts, and the second is training the trainers.'
Friday, 22 June 2007
Looking at early ideas for the Iraq Surge: Bush $1bn jobs plan to draw Iraqis into fold
The battle to win the war in Iraq will apparently be not only include a surge of 20-30,000 US troops, but will include an absolutely massive hearts-and-minds employment-creation campaign:
"The other sweetener will be a doubling of reconstruction efforts. Up to $1bn is to be spent on a programme in which Iraqis are employed to clean the streets and repair and paint schools.
The Pentagon-run scheme would try to draw young men away from insurgent groups and back into the mainstream economy. It would be administered by officials embedded in US combat brigades in a bid to persuade Iraqis that the Americans were there as a force for good and not just of occupation."
The 'embedding' issue will clearly be one for humanitarian organizations to fume about; more importantly, even the least-experienced development worker would ask about the sustainability of spending 1 billion US dollars on ad hoc employment generation projects.
"The other sweetener will be a doubling of reconstruction efforts. Up to $1bn is to be spent on a programme in which Iraqis are employed to clean the streets and repair and paint schools.
The Pentagon-run scheme would try to draw young men away from insurgent groups and back into the mainstream economy. It would be administered by officials embedded in US combat brigades in a bid to persuade Iraqis that the Americans were there as a force for good and not just of occupation."
The 'embedding' issue will clearly be one for humanitarian organizations to fume about; more importantly, even the least-experienced development worker would ask about the sustainability of spending 1 billion US dollars on ad hoc employment generation projects.
Editorial - Where's the police? | IHT
This was originally posted on civilmilitaryrelations-
'Another excellent article written by a civilian expert, lamenting the lack of security as the Achille's heel of what appeared to be an otherwise successful project. This echoes the mantra of 'no security without development, no development without security':
'In the long-term plan, alternative livelihoods meant helping Afghan farmers export high-value crops like saffron and cumin. It meant restoring the orchards and vineyards that had once made Afghanistan a power in the raisin and almond markets. It meant providing credit to farmers who had relied on traffickers for affordable loans.
In the short run, however, with the first eradication tractors already plowing up poppy fields, we had no time for those approaches. Instead, we created public-works jobs. We handed out shovels to thousands of local Afghans and paid them $4 per day to repair canals and roads. By May 2005, we had paid out millions of dollars and had some 14,000 men on the payroll simultaneously.
Security was our Achilles' heel. There was a new American military base by the graveyard on the edge of town, but the few score Iowa National Guard members there lacked the manpower and the local knowledge to protect us. We could not afford the professional security companies in Kabul.''
'Another excellent article written by a civilian expert, lamenting the lack of security as the Achille's heel of what appeared to be an otherwise successful project. This echoes the mantra of 'no security without development, no development without security':
'In the long-term plan, alternative livelihoods meant helping Afghan farmers export high-value crops like saffron and cumin. It meant restoring the orchards and vineyards that had once made Afghanistan a power in the raisin and almond markets. It meant providing credit to farmers who had relied on traffickers for affordable loans.
In the short run, however, with the first eradication tractors already plowing up poppy fields, we had no time for those approaches. Instead, we created public-works jobs. We handed out shovels to thousands of local Afghans and paid them $4 per day to repair canals and roads. By May 2005, we had paid out millions of dollars and had some 14,000 men on the payroll simultaneously.
Security was our Achilles' heel. There was a new American military base by the graveyard on the edge of town, but the few score Iowa National Guard members there lacked the manpower and the local knowledge to protect us. We could not afford the professional security companies in Kabul.''
Congolese radio show gives war victims a voice | csmonitor.com
CSMonitor ran an interesting story on a radio program initiative in the Ituri region of DRC. The program's objective is to provide the following service to its listeners, in the style of a phone-in show. The show is introduced with the following:
'Your questions can concern the way justice is organized, the way it functions, abuses and violations of human rights.'
A sampling of questions from participants:
Are military elements authorized to carry weapons while in civilian clothes?
Various armed groups of Ituri randomly planted mines, which cause great damage among the population. Can this also constitute one of the crimes to be charged against those responsible among armed groups who will be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court?
There is a custom according to which a woman can be abducted by the friends of the one who wants to marry her. In some cases, the young woman is 13 or 14 years old. Will the law condemn this practice?
'Your questions can concern the way justice is organized, the way it functions, abuses and violations of human rights.'
A sampling of questions from participants:
Are military elements authorized to carry weapons while in civilian clothes?
Various armed groups of Ituri randomly planted mines, which cause great damage among the population. Can this also constitute one of the crimes to be charged against those responsible among armed groups who will be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court?
There is a custom according to which a woman can be abducted by the friends of the one who wants to marry her. In some cases, the young woman is 13 or 14 years old. Will the law condemn this practice?
Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War - NYT
NYT has an excellent article on the new front line in Afghanistan- the drug war.
The article doesn't shy away from the evident criticism- that having avoided fighting the opium trade in Afghanistan has seriously eroded the military, political and development progress made elsewhere. The issue of exactly 'who?' should take on the drug war has been a political- and military- hot potato since the 2001 war. At alternating intervals, ISAF, Coalition Forces and the Afghan government have denied their role in the drug war, and often even its importance.
One interlocutor made an interesting parallel with Iraq:
“This is the Afghan equivalent of failing to deal with looting in Baghdad,” said Andre D. Hollis, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics. “If you are not dealing with those who are threatened by security and who undermine security, namely drug traffickers, all your other grandiose plans will come to naught.”<
The article doesn't shy away from the evident criticism- that having avoided fighting the opium trade in Afghanistan has seriously eroded the military, political and development progress made elsewhere. The issue of exactly 'who?' should take on the drug war has been a political- and military- hot potato since the 2001 war. At alternating intervals, ISAF, Coalition Forces and the Afghan government have denied their role in the drug war, and often even its importance.
One interlocutor made an interesting parallel with Iraq:
“This is the Afghan equivalent of failing to deal with looting in Baghdad,” said Andre D. Hollis, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics. “If you are not dealing with those who are threatened by security and who undermine security, namely drug traffickers, all your other grandiose plans will come to naught.”<
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
